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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RICHARD S. MILLERt and ERNEST C. WUNSCH:j: 
During the 1960 Survey period the proposals for reform of 
Michigan procedure and practice submitted by the Joint Committee 
on Michigan Procedural Revision of the State Bar, characterized as 
"the most significant development" of 1959 in last year's Survey,1 lost 
its first battIe for adoption-the statutory revision2 was permitted to 
die in committee during a short session of the legislature. The bill's 
premature demise was generally attributed to the massiveness of the 
bill in relation to the short time available for its study. Understand-
ably, the representatives could not be expected to pass a sizeable 
package of legislation, of wide and varied scope and range, without 
a reasonable opportunity to look into its many ramifications. How-
ever, the need for a general procedural reform is still very much alive, 
and the proposed court rules and statutes go far toward meeting this 
need. Therefore, in the hope that greater understanding of these 
proposals will generate greater support, or at least enlightened criti-
cism, the next time they are up for adoption, brief references will be 
made at selected points in this article to the proposed rules or statutes. 
MICHIGAN COURT RULES 
By virtue of section 3 of Rule 1 and its construction in Darr v. 
Buckley,3 statutes which deal with matters of practice and procedure, 
if they are not in conflict with any court rule, and even though they 
deal with matters inherently trusted to the courts, are themselves to 
be treated as court rules. Thus, in Miller v. F. W. Woolworth Co./ 
the court held that Section 38 of the Employment Security Act,5 deal-
ing with appeals from the Appeal Board of the Employment Security 
Commission, is to be given the status of a court rule. While the result 
of individual cases, such as Miller, may not be bad, the court's legiti-
mizing of a multitude of statutes containing non-conflicting procedural 
matter can only bode evil for the time-pressed practitioner and judge, 
for these reasons: 1) The Michigan statutes, like the Bible, speak on 
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1. Wunsch, Civil Procedure, 1959 Survey of Mich. Law, 6 Wayne L. Rev. 157 
(1959). 
2. H.R. 1 (1959). 
3. 355 Mich. 392, 94 N.W.2d 837 (1959), discussed in Wunsch, supra note 1, at 
159, 160. 
4. 359 Mich. 342, 102 N.W.2d 728 (1960). 
5. C.L.S. 1956 § 421.38, M.S.A. § 17.540 (Cum. Supp. 1959). 
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almost every point. 2) No practitioner will be safe in assuming that 
a seemingly comprehensive court rule is the last word on a procedural 
point, but the statutes will have to be scoured for coverage of the 
same matter. 3) If an applicable statute is found, it r.lust then be 
determined whether it conflicts with the court rule, in which case it 
can be ignored or, if it does not conflict, it must be followed. Because 
the court has recorded its unwillingness to find a conflict between 
court rule and statute unless the conflict is very clear, 0 compliance 
with the statute will almost always be necessary. A look at the variety 
of court rules and statutes appertaining to pre-trial discovery, for 
example, will make our meaning clear.7 Court Rule 1, section 3, does 
not appear in the proposed court rules. 
Early in the Survey period the court adopted Rule 72A,s which 
provides that certain controlling questions of public law, pending be-
fore a tribunal from which appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court, 
may be certified to the Supreme Court if the governor, by executive 
message, indicates that it is· of such public moment as to require 
early determination. 
On the same day the court also adopted detailed rules "Concern-
ing the Superintendence of the Judiciary of Michigan."g Briefly, these 
rules provide that an administrator appointed by the Supreme Court 
can investigate the affairs of any court or tribunal in the judicial de-
partment or the conduct of any state judicial officer, and make recom-
mendations to the chief justice. If the investigation reveals the 
possibility of certain types of misconduct enumerated in the rules, a 
hearing, with proper safeguards, can result in disciplinary action 
against the offending officer. These new rules, if diligently imple-
mented, could do much to insure honest and orderly administration 
of the state's judiciary. Certainly, they go a long way toward effec-
tuating the Supreme Court's superintending power over the lower 
courts, provided for in the Michigan Constitution.lO 
STATUTES 
Until last year, the statutes did not expressly indicate the course 
to be taken by a defendant, sued in a justice court, who wished to 
assert a set-off or recoupment in excess of the jurisdictional amount 
6. See, e.g., Masonite Corp. v. Martin, 314 Mich. 411, 22 N.W.2d 757 (1946); 
Ismond v. Scougale, 119 Mich. 501, 78 N.w. 546 (1899). 
7. M.C.R. 31; M.C.R. 35, § 6; M.C.R. 40; M.C.R. 41; C.L. § 617.1, M.S.A. 
§ 27.849; C.L. §§ 617.6-.13, M.S.A. §§ 27.854-.861; C.L. § 617.13, M.S.A. § 27.913; C.L. 
§ 691.631, M.S.A. § 27.951, C.L. § 441.179, M.S.A. § 28.78(9); C.L. §§ 601.17-.23, 
M.S.A. §§ 27.37-.43; C.L. § 691.671, M.S.A. § 27.475(1); C.L. §§ 641.21-.22, M.S.A. 
§§ 27.2411-.2412. This list is not exhaustive. 
8. 356 Mich. at xiii (1959), mentioned briefly in Wunsch, supra note 1, at 162. 
9. Id. at xv (1959). 
10. Mich. Const. art. VII, § 4. 
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to which that court is limited. The statutell allowed the defendant 
either to assert his claim and be satisfied with a judgment equal to 
the statutory maximum, or to withdraw his claim and sue for it 
separately in a subsequent action. The res judicata effect of the first 
judgment, however, might forever bar the defendant from bringing 
the second action.12 Thus, in some cases the justice court could, for 
all practical purposes, finally determine a controversy in which the 
real amount in controversy exceeded its jurisdictional maximum. A 
less serious effect was to require two or more closely related matters to 
be tried separately. A new statute, passed in 1959, has resolved these 
problems.13 If defendant's set-off or recoupment exceeds the court's 
monetary jurisdiction, he may, by following a simple procedure, 
have the entire proceedings removed to circuit court for trial. 
A few other statutory additions and amendments to the Judica-
ture Act and the Probate Code are worthy of passing notice: In an 
appeal from a justice court to a circuit court the fees have been 
slightly increased, the time within which costs must be paid has 
been expanded, and specific provision has been made for cases where 
the final day for appeal falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday.14 A 
new statute requires certain administrative actions of municipal court 
judges to be taken by a majority of all the full-time judges in the court 
involved.l(j A recent amendment has enlarged the time within which 
a writ of restitution may be issued from five to ten days and, if the 
purchaser has paid over fifty per cent of the purchase price, to six 
months (during which time the defendant may redeem).16 One amend-
ment to the Probate Code denotes an executor named in decedent's 
will as an interested party who may petition the court for appoint-
ment of a special administrator of the decedent's estate,17 and another 
permits him to apply to the probate court for a determination of 
heirs, when they are not specified in the grant or conveyance in 
question.IS 
In summary proceedings to recover the possession of land in a 
county having a population of more than 180,000 and less than 
1,000,000, the complaint must now be made only to a circuit court 
11. C.L. § 669.14, M.S.A. § 27.3241. 
12. See Jones v. Chamhers, 353 Mich. 674, 91 N.W.2d 889 (1958), discussed in 
\Vunsch, supra note 1, at 158. 
13. P.A. 1959,249, C.L. § 669.17a, M.S.A. § 27.3244(1) (Cum. Supp. 1959). 
14. P.A. 1959, 100, C.L. § 678.6, M.S.A. § 27.3486 (Cum. Supp. 1959). 
15. P.A. 1959, 120, C.L. § 730.125a, M.S.A. § 27.3855(1) (Cum. Supp. 1959). 
16. P.A. 1959, 249, C.L. § 630.25, M.S.A. § 27.1999 (Cum. Supp. 1959). 
17. P.A. 1959, 126, C.L. § 702.60, M.S.A. § 27.3178(130) (Cum. Supp. 1959). 
18. P.A. 1959, 126, C.L. § 702.75, M.S.A. § 27.3178(145) (Cum. Supp. 1959). See 
also C.L. § 702.78, M.S.A. § 27.3178(148). 
10 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7 
commissioner.19 This amendment also provides that each commis-
sioner may appoint not more than four bailiffs, and the bailiffs so 
appointed will serve all process, summonses and writs issued by the 
circuit court commissioner in summary proceedings. 
Lastly, the installment judgment statute has been amended20 to 
prevent judges from altering the amounts and times of payment of 
installment judgments after the initial order without first giving notice 
to the other party. In addition, the garnishment of wages to recover 
such a judgment can now be ordered by the court only after due notice 
to the defendant and only if installments are due when the order is 
made. To further protect the rights of installment judgment debtors, 
a section has been added to the statute which requires the proceedings 
for an installment judgment to appear as part of the record of the 
judgment, and which strictly controls the issuance of a transcript of 
the judgment. 
RECENT DECISIONS 
Jurisdiction: In two cases of collateral attack on foreign judg-
ments based on lack of jurisdiction, the court sustained the jurisdic-
tion of the out-state court. Neither case represents a change in prin-
ciples which are generally accepted. In the first, Johnson v. Haley,21 
defendant entered a special appearance in a California trial court, 
contesting its jurisdiction. She argued that service on her in Michigan 
by publication, under a statute permitting such service on persons 
involved in automobile accidents in California,22 was improper since 
she was not the owner of the car nor was the driver her agent. When 
the California court ruled against her on this point she withdrew from 
the case, but the trial continued and resulted in a judgment for plain-
tiff. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that she was barred from 
attacking the jurisdiction of the California court by her failure to 
appeal the adverse ruling on jurisdiction through the courts of that 
state. In Ohio Dep't of Taxation v. Kleitch Bros., Inc.,23 the court 
upheld the personal jurisdiction of an Ohio court in assessing a tax 
on defendant and entering a judgment in that court without first serv-
ing process upon him. The decision was based, inter alia, on the right 
of a state to collect taxes through summary proceedings. 
19. P.A. 1959, 157, C.L. § 630.13, M.S.A. § 27.1987 (Cum. Supp. 1959). 
20. P.A. 1959, 167, C.L. §§ 691.715, .717, .721, M.S.A. §§ 27.1485, .1487, .1491 
(Cum. Supp. 1959). 
21. 357 Mich. 411, 98 N.W.2d 555 (1959). This case is a1s·) discussed infra 
with respect to res judicata. 
22. As to the constitutionality of such statutes, see Hess v. Pllowski, 244 U.S. 
352 (1927). 
23. 357 Mich. 504, 98 N.W.2d 636 (1959). 
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In a third case, Young v. Morrall,24 the court upheld a judgment 
against garnishee defendant, a Michigan corporation, where juris-
diction was originally acquired by personal service of a writ of attach-
ment. Garnishee defendant entered a special appearance and moved 
to dissolve the attachment, which was granted. It then entered a 
general appearance, which it later withdrew. By affirming the judg-
ment for plaintiff the court tacitly approved the lower court's finding 
of personal jurisdiction. It is not stated whether jurisdiction was 
acquired by personal service of the attachment writ or by the general 
appearance, but it is reasonable to assume that either would suffice to 
confer such jurisdiction. The dissolution of the attachment would not 
serve to destroy jurisdiction, since the writ is also a summons; the 
unilateral withdrawal by the defendant of its general appearance 
would likewise fail to destroy the jurisdiction previously acquired. 
Pleading: In Ginger v. BrookfteliJ25 plaintiff filed his declaration 
seeking attorney's fees and defendant answered. Plaintiff then filed 
an amended declaration incorporating by reference his original decla-
ration and adding the following allegation: 
Plaintiff alleges the fact to be that when demand was made upon de-
fendant to pay statements rendered on balance of his account, his only 
complaint was that he was not certain such legal expense was an allow-
able deduction on income ta,.'r return, saying, "If I was sure they were 
allowed, I would pay them."26 
The defendant did not file an amended answer. On plaintiff's appeal 
from a relatively low verdict in his favor, the court affirmed on the 
ground that plaintiff had failed to establish the condition precedent, 
the defendant's firm belief that the fees would be deductible. Aside 
from the fact that this ground may be untenable,27 it would have 
been preferable for the court to have decided the more important 
questions it raised and then side-stepped: (1) Did the amendment 
contain a "material allegation" which, if not answered, constitutes 
an admission,28 and if so, (2) did plaintiff's failure to call the attention 
of the pre-trial judge to defendant's failure to answer constitute a 
waiver of the admission?29 The court might also have considered 
24. 359 Mich. 180, 101 N.W.Zd 358 (1960), also discussed infra under the topic 
"Stipulations." 
25. 359 Mich. 1, 101 N.W.2d 351 (1960). 
26. Id. at 2, 101 N.W.2d at 351. 
27. It can be argued that the quoted allegation was only included by plaintiff to 
show that defendant admitted owing the fees, and that the so-called condition precedent, 
never properly raised in plaintiff's declaration or defendant's answer, should be dis-
regarded. 
28. M.C.R. 23, § 2. Defendant was not required to file a new answer to the 
amended declaration. M.C.R. 26, § 3. 
29. M.C.R. 35, § 4(4). 
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the propriety of pleadings of this type which contain evidentiary 
matter.30 
Perhaps the foregoing case indicates the court's unwillingness 
to strike down pleadings for unimportant technical errors.S1 This 
theory is supported by the decision in Nowicki v. Podgorski.32 There 
the court held that, absent a timely objection, it was not error to put 
a claim for damages for fraud in the same count with a claim for 
damages arising from violation of a non-competition clause in a 
contract. 
Detroit Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n33 and Peoples Savings 
Bank V. Stoddard34 dealt, respectively, with amendments to pleadings 
during and after trial, construing Court Rule 25. In the first case the 
court held that amendments during trial are proper where the opposite 
party is "offered . . . time for study or preparation or production of 
additional testimony,"35 especially where the amendment does not 
conflict with the party's basic position and no surprise is claimed. In 
the second case the court refused to permit the trial court to plant its 
decision in an amendment offered after proofs were in, where defend-
ants were not given the "opportunity to answer, reopen proofs, and 
brief and argue the issue prior to decision."36 Both cases indicate that 
amendments will only be countenanced where the opposite party is 
offered a fair chance to respond to the new pleading. The proposed 
court rules would not seem to change the result of the~,e cases.37 
Joinder: Joinder of parties defendant was permitted in Pullum 
Window Corp. v. Feldstein,3s where plaintiff sued five individual de-
fendants to recover the purchase price of merchandise sold to an 
Indiana corporation with which the defendants were connected. The 
declaration contained three counts, one based on an Indiana statute, 
the second sounding in trespass on the case, and the third on the 
common counts in assumpsit. The court held that the several claims 
constituted but one cause of action.39 Since this single cause was being 
30. See M.C,R. 17, §§ 1,2. 
31. See Hongiman, Mich. Court Rules Annot. 165 (1949). 
32. 359 Mich. 18, 101 N.W.2d 371 (1960). 
33. 359 Mich. 137, 101 N.W.2d 273 (1960). 
34. 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960). 
35. Supra note 33, at 144, 101 N.W.2d at 276. 
36. Supra note 34, at 325, 102 N.W.2d at 791. 
37. State Bar of Michigan, Part III, Final Report, Joint Committee on Michigan 
Procedural Revision, Rule 10.18 (1960). (This report will hereinafter be cited as "pro-
posed rules.") 
38. 357 Mich. 82, 97 N.W.2d 762 (1959). 
39. The court distinguished Coke v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 270 Mich. 
233, 258 N.W. 257 (1935). 
The court has defined the term "cause of action" in earlier decisbns. See Multiple."I: 
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Saxer, 310 Mich. 243, 253, 17 N.W.2d 169, 172 (1945); 
1960J CIVIL PROCEDURE 13 
asserted against all of the defendants, the joinder statute was not 
violated.40 The court expressly relied on the rule of the leading case 
of Gilmer v. J.l1iller,41 but nowhere in its opinion did it go through 
the detailed analysis caIled for in Gilmer to determine whether the 
joinder served the ends of justice. 
The Restatement of Torts provides that in an automobile negli-
gence case where suit is brought under the statute holding the owner 
liable for injury negligently caused by his automobile, it is not neces-
sary to join every co-owner, each of whom may be proceeded against 
separately.42 Citing this section of the Restatement, the court held, in 
Frazier v. Rumisek,43 that if one of two joint owners of the auto-
mobile dies, it is not necessary to join the deceased's estate in a suit 
to recover from the survivor. 
The knotty problems of joinder of parties, only partly raised by 
the foregoing cases, but forcefully illustrated in a long line of difficult 
and sometimes confusing decisions culminating in Pullum Window 
Corp.,44 is treated clearly and logicaIly in the proposed court rules.45 
In brief, parties must be joined if "their presence in the action is 
essential to permit the court to render complete relief'146 and may 
join or be joined if there is some common legal or factual thread which 
binds them together or which wiIl make their presence in the action 
promotive of the "convenient administration of justice,"47 the same 
requirement construed in Gilmer. The strictness of the "necessary 
joinder" provision and the liberality of the "permissive joinder" pro-
vision is in large measure mitigated by provisions which give the 
courts broad discretion to proceed without parties or to order separate 
trials based largely on considerations of common sense to prevent un-
fairness, delay, extra expense, and embarrassment.48 
Class Actions: It is obvious that a class suit should not be availed 
of to provide a larger fee for an attorney who commences a private 
suit the result of which happens, incidentally, to benefit a larger group. 
The Supreme Court implicitly agreed in Simpson v. Mulle.49 There, 
Brewster Loud Lumber Co. v. General Builders' Supply Co., 233 Mich. 633, 638, 208 
N.W. 28, 30 (1926); Otto v. Village of Highland Park, 204 Mich. 74, 80, 169 N.W. 
904, 906 (1918). 
40. C.L. § 608.1, M.s.A. § 27.591. 
41. 319 Mich. 136, 29 N.W.2d 264 (1947). See discussion in King & Wunsch, 
Civil Procedure, 1958 Survey of Mich. Law,S Wayne L. Rev. 175, 178-181 (1958). 
42. Restatement, Torts §§ 878, 882 (1939). 
43. 358 Mich. 455, 100 N.W.2d 442 (1960). 
44. Supra note 38. 
45. Proposed rules 20.3-20.7, 50.5.2. 
46. rd. 20.5. 
47. rd. 20.6. 
48. rd. 20.5.2, 20.6.2, 50.5.2. 
49. 358 Mich. 441, 100 N.W.2d 490 (1960). 
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plaintiff sued to recover attorneys fees alleging that he had success-
fully prosecuted a class suit and that the members of the class should 
cough up his fee. He had succeeded in securing a consent decree 
which set aside an assessment for a drain relocation, b'Qt did not suc-
ceed in securing an injunction against a subsequent relocation. The 
court noted that a subsequent relocation might cost some of the so-
called class members more, and others less, than the voided relocation; 
that no notice had been given pursuant to Rule 16; that the bill on 
its face, by speaking of the "[p ]laintiffs and 'the other resident and 
non-resident owners' " did not purport to be a class action; and ruled 
that no showing was made that the entire class was adequately repre-
sented. If this had been a class suit in the first place, the consent de-
cree, not favorable to all members of the class, could not have been 
entered without the court's approval after notice to the members of 
the class.50 This would have given such members an opportunity to 
object to the decree. 
The proposed court rules contain section 1 of Rule 16 essentially 
unchanged. New sections are added which enable the court to enter 
a variety of orders to better protect absent class members,'H which 
expand the requirements for actions brought by fiduciaries where it 
is impractical to bring all the beneficiaries before the court,02 and 
which require particular allegations, under oath, to be contained in 
a complaint in an action to enforce secondary rights of shareholders 
against their association.53 
Res judicata: Merger: A series of cases handed down during 
the Survey period reaffirmed the well-accepted rule of res judicata 
and merger: "Res judicata applies not only to issues which were 
determined on their merits but also to matters which the parties had 
an opportunity to present for adjudication."M In Johnson v. Haleyuu 
the Supreme Court ruled that defendant's failure to appeal a Cali-
fornia trial court's denial of her motion to quash service through the 
appellate courts of that state barred her from again raising the same 
issue in a collateral attack on the California judgment when plaintiff 
sought to enforce it in this state. In Strech v. Blissfi~ld Community 
Schools Dist.56 plaintiff's bill of complaint to set aside a condemnation 
award originally made in proceedings at law, on the ground that the 
50. M.C.R. 16, § 1. 
51. Proposed rule 20.8.4. 
52. Id. 20.8.3. 
53. Id. 20.8.2. 
54. Strech v. Blissfield Community Schools Dist., 357 Mich. 620, 623, 99 N.W.2d 
545, 546 (1959). 
55. 357 Mich. 411, 98 N.W.2d 555 (1959), discussed supra under the topic 
"Jurisdiction." 
56. Supra note 54. 
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bias and prejudice of the jurors was fraudulently concealed, was dis-
missed. Normal diligence on plaintiff's part would have disclosed 
such bias and prejudice during the original hearing and appeal. Such 
matters as were raised or should have been raised then cannot now be 
urged in a collateral attack on the award. 
More interesting, perhaps, is the case of Shank v. Castle 57 where 
plaintiff's action at law to recover damages for mental anguish as the 
result of her parent's breach of an agreement for custody of her child 
was dismissed because plaintiff could have asked for damages in an 
earlier chancery suit brought by her parents for custody of the child. 
In the earlier suit plaintiff filed a cross-bill alleging mental anguish 
and successfully prayed for custody of the child. She did not, how-
ever, ask for damages for breach of the prior agreement. Her failure 
then to request such damages was fatal to her law action. 
'Where the issues or the parties are not the same as those before 
the court in the prior litigation, it is well settled that res judicata 
does not apply. Thus, a prior successful suit to quiet title to property 
is not decisive in a subsequent suit for an injunction to restrain inter-
ference with the property against a defendant who was not a party 
in the prior suit.58 A circuit court can litigate, in a libel suit, the 
issue of the truth of defendant's statements about the plaintiff with 
respect to her ethics as a real estate broker even though, in a prior 
hearing before the deputy commissioner of the Michigan Corporation 
and Securities Commission to revoke her license, the complaint, based 
on the same unethical conduct allegedly published by defendant, was 
dismissed because unproved. GO 
The proposed court rules contain a somewhat unique but sensible 
application of the merger doctrine. The parties are required, with 
limited exceptions, to join all claims "which at the time of serving 
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
action."GO This seems to embrace the generally accepted rule against 
splitting causes of action. In the ordinary case, as in Shank v. Castle, 
discussed above, the full thrust of this rule does not appear until 
subsequent litigation, when res judicata or merger is pleaded to bar 
a party from asserting a claim he could have raised in a prior action. 
At this time, it is too late for him to correct his earlier omission and 
his right, which may be substantial, will go unredressed. The pro-
posed court rule, however, requires the party who may later desire to 
57. 357 Mich. 290, 98 N.W.2d 579 (1959), discussed infra under the topic "Law 
and Equity." This decision contains a good statement of the rules of res judicata. 
58. Giegling v. HeImbold, 357 Mich. 462, 98 N.W.2d 536 (1959). 
59. Cochrane v. Wittbold, 359 Mich. 402, 102 N.W.2d 459 (1960). 
60. Proposed rule 20.3.1. 
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assert the Claim of merger to object, by motion at pre-trial, to im-
proper failure to join. His failure to so move constitutes a waiver of 
the joinder rules and the other party will not be barred by merger 
from later raising the claims not actually litigated. The result is 
that, unless the opposite party files timely objection, plaintiff may 
split his cause of action. This proposed rule fairly places the burden 
of calling the court's attention to a split cause of action on the party 
who may later get a windfall as a result of it. 
Law and Equity: Under existing rules of practice, an action at 
law and a suit in equity cannot be consolidated, but they can be heard 
at the same time.131 Thus, in Insealator, Inc. v. Wallace62 an action 
at law for commissions was combined for trial with a chancery action 
for injunctive relief and damages for breach of a fiduciary relation-
ship and appropriation of trade secrets. This is certainly an efficient 
way to handle related matters under existing procedure, and perhaps 
a preview of procedural reform to come. However, the decisions in 
other recent actions involving the division between law and equity 
wreaked havoc on plaintiff's otherwise legitimate claims. In Hack 
Inv. Co. v. Concrete Wall CO.63 plaintiff paid a judgment in a negli-
gence action and then attempted to recover all or part of his money 
back from a joint tort-feasor. He started in equity to secure in-
demnity and, on defendant's motion to dismiss, was advised either 
to transfer to law or to amend his complaint to seek contribution. He 
elected to transfer to law, where he lost his case by failing to prove 
freedom from concurrent negligence. He then commenced a new suit 
at law for reimbursement of his proportionate share of the loss, but 
ran afoul of a statute which provides that contribution among joint 
tort-feasors must be brought in equity within six months after plaintiff 
discharges the original judgment.64 On appeal, the allowance of de-
fendant's motion to dismiss was affirmed. Had the plaintiff been per-
mitted, in the first instance, to seek indemnity or contribution in the 
alternative in a single complaint before a unified court, as he may do 
under the proposed reform, the result might have been different;05 
defendant might not have been left with a windfall. Similarly, in 
Shank v. Castle,136 where plaintiff's action at law to recover damages 
for breach of a custody agreement was dismissed on the grounds of 
res judicata because the claim should have been raised in a prior 
61. Van Kovering v. Eggebeen, 292 Mich. 457, 290 N.W. 867 (1940). 
62. 357 Mich. 233, 98 N.W.2d 643 (1959). 
63. 356 Mich. 416, 97 N.W.2d 106 (1959). 
64. C.L. §§ 691.561-.564, M.S.A. §§ 27.1683(1)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 1959). 
65. Provided plaintiff had commenced his action within sL" months after satisfy-
ing the judgment, as required by the statute. 
66. Supra note 57. 
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equity action, a different result might have obtained if plaintiff (who 
was defendant in the earlier action) had been required to plead all of 
her claims arising out of the same transaction in her original cross-
bill.61 
The abolition of procedural distinctions between law and equity 
is a significant aspect of the proposed reform. This change from 
existing practice, it should be firmly noted, is not in any way intended 
to impinge upon well established substantive distinctions between the 
two bodies of law.68 Thus, the constitutional right to trial by jury in 
actions at law and the exercise of the chancellor's "equitable dis-
cretion" are carefully preserved. Other states have succeeded in uni-
fying the procedure without clouding the distinctions of substancej 69 
there is no reason why Michigan cannot also do so. 
Pre-trial Discovery: In an important decision 70 construing Ru1e 
35, section 6, the court brought the scope of the Michigan discovery 
rules, at least in one area, closer to those of federal practice. With 
Justices Black, Kelly and Kavanagh dissenting, the court held that, 
notwithstanding the Dead Man's Act,71 the representative of de-
ceased's estate can take a deposition from an "opposite party" which 
includes matters equally within the knowledge of the deceased, with-
out waiving the witness' disqualification to testify at the trial. Rule 
35, section 6 (b), which limits the taking of depositions to relevant 
matters "admissible under the rules of evidence governing trials," was 
held to pertain only to the evidence itself and not to the qualifica-
tions of the witness from whose mouth it issues.72 
This decision, as Justice Black notes in his dissent, may leave a 
substantial tactical advantage in the hands of the protected party if 
the pre-trial judge grants his motion for discovery of the disqualified 
witness. Having taken the deposition and learned information vital 
67. It is not clear whether plaintiff failed to request such damages in her cross-
bill because counsel believed that a joinder of a legal claim was improper, or whether 
the thought of damages did not occur to plaintiff until she succeeded in the equity 
action. In any event, it would have been much more difficult to waive the damages 
claim by oversight had the proposed reform been in effect. 
68. See State Bar of Michigan, Part I, Final Report, Joint Committee on Michi-
gan Procedural Revision 17, 18 (1960). 
69. See Blume & Reed, Pleading and Joinder 266 (1952). 
70. Banaszkiewicz v. Baun, 359 Mich. 109, 101 N.W.2d 306 (1960) .. 
71. C.L. § 617.65, M.S.A. § 27.914. 
72. M.C.R. 31, § 1, and 35, § 6(d) seem to permit depositions, once taken, to be 
read at the trial and to be used for a variety of purposes. If this were to be auto-
matically permitted in the case of a deposition taken from an "opposite party" whose 
testimony is excludable under the Dead Man's Act, these rules, in conjunction with the 
instant case, would effectively nullify that statute. Therefore, the court noted, by way 
of dictum, that the protected party may object under M.C.R. 35, § 6(e) to the intro-
duction of the deposition at the trial, and have it excluded. 
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to his cause, he can then use it or not at the trial as he sees fit, while 
the other party has absolutely no voice in the decision. Thus, for 
those who desire the extension of discovery to relevant matters, even 
though excludable at trial, for the purpose of ferretting out other 
evidence which may be admitted, this decision is a first step. Perhaps, 
with the dissent, it can be argued that the court rules should not be 
extended beyond their obvious and advertised73 limits by judicial 
decision, but only by amendment to the court rules. Adoption of the 
proposed court rules, which broaden discovery by deposition to in-
clude testimony "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence,n74 would do the job. 
In one other case dealing with depositions/a the court held that 
Court Rule 35, section 6 ( d) (2), which permits the deposition of a 
party to be used "for any purpose," is qualified by the requirement, 
in section 6 ( d), that it be "admissible under the rules of evidence." 
Therefore, it was not error to exclude from evidence a deposition 
containing irrelevant and immaterial matter. However, the court 
seemed to approve the use of the same deposition to contradict or 
impeach the deponent, notwithstanding the inadmissible matter.76 
Pre-trial Conference: Court Rule 23, section 2, provides that a 
material allegation in a declaration or bill of complaint which is not 
answered constitutes an admission by defendant. Some language in 
Ginger v. Brookfield77 raises the possibility that the requirement that 
admissions of fact be considered at the pre-trial conference78 may 
impose upon the plaintiff the duty to call the court's attention to such 
admissions or waive their benefit. Such a rule would prevent defend-
ant from making a damaging admission by oversight. 
The judge's pre-trial summary "controls the subsequent course of 
the action unless modified at or before trial to prevent manifest in-
justice.1l79 Does the passage of a new ordinance, clearly applicable 
to the case, after the issuance of the pre-trial summary but prior to 
trial, entitle a party to amend the summary and his pleadings to in-
dicate reliance on the ordinance? The answer is No:. at least in a 
case where the ordinance is obviously passed to help defendant defend 
the suit and where, if the amendment were allowed, it would clearly 
be decisive. This was the effect of a split decision in Willingham v. 
73. See Honigman, Mich. Court Rules Annot. 78 (Supp. 1959). 
74. Proposed rule 30.2. 
75. Insealator, Inc. v. Wallace, 357 Mich. 233, 98 N.W.2d 64~· (1959), also dis-
cussed supra under the topic "Law and Equity." 
76. See M.C.R. 35, § 6(d)(1). 
77. 359 Mich. 1, 101 N.W.2d 351 (1960), also discussed supra under the topic 
"Pleading." 
78. M.C.R. 35, § 4(4). 
79. M.C.R. 34, § 4. 
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City of Dearborn/o where plaintiff sought by mandamus to force the 
city to issue a permit to build a structure based on plans which would 
have violated no zoning ordinance or other law in effect when the 
permit was originally refused, but which would have violated the 
zoning ordinance subsequently passed apparently for the purpose of 
preventing plaintiff from implementing his building plans. Under-
standably, the courts, both circuit and Supreme, were "irked by such 
pendente legislation and its suit defensive purpose." For that reason, 
as well as the four to four split, the case should not be taken as the 
last word on the important question whether new and applicable law, 
appearing after pre-trial summary but before trial, can, by amend-
ment to the pre-trial summary and pleadings, become relevant to the 
decision of the case.81 
Stipulations: An oral stipulation made in open court between the 
parties, read into the record, which effects a settlement of the case 
conditioned upon certain acts by the defendant, is binding upon the 
court where the substantial rights of only the parties are involved and 
where the defendant performed the conditions in reliance on the 
stipulation.82 Thus, the court cannot tax costs and attorney's fees 
to the defendant where the stipulation provided that, upon the con-
ditions being fulfilled, the cause would be dismissed without costs. For 
some reason the court did not mention Rule 11. 
Of course, stipulations executed in accordance with Rule 11 are 
also binding upon the parties. In Young v. Morrall83 garnishee de-
fendant, an insurance company, agreed with plaintiff's attorney that 
the issue of its liability should be decided by the court solely on briefs. 
In their stipulation it was agreed that all facts in plaintiff's declaration 
be taken as true and admitted. As a result of this stipulation, gar-
nishee defendant was prevented from asserting as a defense a clause 
in the policy which might have relieved it from liability were it per-
mitted to raise new facts contradicting plaintiff's declaration. 
There is a possibility, suggested in the Bowman case,s4 supra, that 
the court can ignore a stipUlation as to facts if it so chooses, and pro-
80. 359 Mich. 7, 101 N.W.2d 294 (1960). 
81. This view of the case is further supported by the affirming opinion which 
noted that there was no claim of abuse of judicial discretion in denying the modification 
nor was there any claim that the modification was necessary "to prevent manifest 
injustice." 
The interesting question yet remains, what will the Supreme Court do when the 
city attempts to revoke the license to build under the authority of Lansing v. Dawley, 
247 Mich. 394, 225 N.W. 500 (1929)? 
82. Bowman v. Coleman, 356 Mich. 390, 97 N.W.2d 118 (1959). 
83. 359 Mich. 180, 101 N.W.2d 358 (1960), also discussed supra under the topic 
"Jurisdiction." 
84. Supra note 82. 
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ceed to find the true facts. However, the trial court did not attempt 
to do this in Young v. Morrall. 
The proposed court rule with respect to stipulations is substan-
tially the same as current Court Rule 11.85 
Statutes of Limitations: In two cases decided during the Survey 
period the court ruled that the three year tort statute of limitationsS6 
applies to an action by the state and an action against a city. In the 
first case, People v. Clement,81 the State of Michigan was prevented 
from bringing a trespass action more than three years after the acts 
took place even though the state was acting in its sovereign capacity.s8 
In the second case, Marks v. City of Battle Creek,89 the court struck 
down city charter provisions which, by requiring notke to the city 
within sixty days after the injury, and by prohibiting the commence-
ment of suit until the city had a reasonable opportunity to investigate 
the alleged claim, had the effect of shortening the three year statutory 
period. Similar provisions in city charters and ordinances of other 
Michigan cities will be nullified by the decision in this case. 
Right to Jury Trial: In a certification of a will contest from 
probate to circuit court in a judicial circuit with a population greater 
than 500,000, the right to trial by jury will not be waived if demand 
for jury is.filed in the circuit court by the party requesting the certi-
fication within fifteen days after the exemplification of the record is 
filed in that court. Thus the court, in In re Miller's Estate,90 resolved 
a conflict between various court rules. In that case c.ontestant filed 
a demand for jury trial in the circuit court on the same day that 
the exemplification and probate appeal were filed. Before trial, propo-
nent asked for, and got, a ruling from the circuit judge to the effect 
that contestant had, by virtue of Court Rule 75, sections 7 (a) and 
(b), waived its right to jury trial. These rules provide, in effect, that 
jury trial is waived unless a demand for same is filed in the probate 
court with the circuit court's order allowing the appeal, and the sug-
gested practice has been to file the demand with the claim of appeal,1Jl 
or, in this case, with the application for certification. In reversing for 
a jury trial, the court relied on Court Rule 33, section 2, and Rule 75, 
section 21, rather than on Rule 75, sections 7(a) and (b). Rule 75, 
section 21, provides that parties desiring certification of a will con-
85. Proposed rule 50.7.9. 
86. C.L. § 609.13, M.S.A. § 27.605. 
87. 356 Mich. 314, 96 N.W.2d 804 (1959). 
88. CL. § 609.28, M.S.A. § 27.620 made the limitations applicable to the state. 
89. 358 Mich. 114, 99 N.W.2d 587 (1959). 
90. 359 Mich. 167, 101 N.W.2d 381 (1960). 
91. See Honigman, Mich. Court Rules Annot. 235, 242 (Supp. 1959). 
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test under the statute92 must file their application and bond in the 
same fashion and subject to the same provisions as in an appeal from 
the probate court to circuit court. Rule 33, section 2, referring ex-
pressly to Rule 75, section 21, provides that in a certification of a 
will contest demand for jury may be filed by the applicant in the 
circuit court within fifteen days after filing the exemplification of the 
will contest. Thus, reading the rules in pari materia, the fifteen day 
rule for claiming jury trial becomes effective. 
Aside from its practical consequences, what makes this case 
interesting is the manner in which the court applied to court rules the 
maxim "that all acts relating to the same subject, or having the same 
general purpose, shall be read ... as together constituting one law.n93 
This it did in the face of the first paragraph of Rule 75, which pro-
vides: "In each judicial circuit with a population of 500,000 or up-
wards, appeals to the circuit court from any probate court shall, in all 
civil cases (except condemnation cases) be exclusively governed by 
the following sections, unless otherwise provided in this rule, any 
present or future inconsistent or additional statutory requirements to 
the contrary notwithstanding." (Emphasis added.) If Rule 33, sec-
tion 2, had been ignored in compliance with this clear direction, the 
case could not have been reversed for new triaL Likewise, this same 
result would also obtain under the proposed court rules, which provide 
that claim for jury trial by the applicant for certification of a will 
contest must be included in his claim of appeal filed in the probate 
court.94 
Voir Dire: The important rule announced during the 1959 Sur-
vey period by Justice Black in Darr v. Buckley,95 to the effect that 
in an action to recover for personal injuries or death resulting from 
an automobile accident, jurors may not be questioned on voir dire as 
to their affiliation or connection with defendant's insurer,96 was ap-
proved and followed in Rouse v. Gross97 and DeGroff v. Clark.9s The 
problem of how best to get at information relating to a juror's mem-
bership or other relationship to defendant's insurance company, also 
discussed in Darr v. Buckley, is simply and effectively solved by the 
proposed court rules.99 They require a personal history questionnaire 
92. C.L. § 701.36, M.S.A. § 27.3178(36). See also C.L. § 701.42, M.S.A. 
§ 27.3178(42). 
93. Supra note 90, at 172, 101 N.Wold at 384. 
94. Proposed rule 50.8.2(2). See also proposed rule 70.3. 
95. 355 Mich. 292, 94 N.W.2d 837 (1959). 
96. This is a result of C.L. § 500.3030, M.S.A. § 24.13030 (Cum. Supp. 1959) 
which, by virtue of M.C.R. 1, § 3, is adopted by the court as a rule of practice. See 
the discussion of court rules supra, this article. 
97. 357 Mich. 475, 98 N.W.2d 562 (1959). 
98. 358 Mich. 274, 100 N.W.2d 214 (1960). 
99. Proposed rule 50.10.1. 
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to be filled out by all jurors disclosing a wide variety of information, 
including key questions to reveal insurance affiliation, which will en-
able counsel to intelligently and effectively exercise their challenges 
without at the same time casting undue emphasis on the possibility 
that defendant may be insured. 
Peremptory challenges are not permitted in condemnation cases 
and challenges for cause are limited to enumerated standards.1oo In 
Strech v. Blissfield Community Schools Dist./o1 the court held that 
these limitations do not effect the constitutional validity of the con-
demnation statutes. Peremptory challenges are not required by due 
process, and the "standards for disqualifications for cause are set up 
in the statute sufficiently to justify determination as to whether a 
proposed juror is in a position to enter a fair and just verdict.lllo2 
Trial: Opening Statement to Jury: Court Rule 37, section 2, 
provides that it is plaintiff's "duty ... before offering evidence ... 
to make a full and fair statement of his case and of facts which he 
expects to prove." Is the court under any duty to advise the plaintiff 
to amplify his opening statement before ordering a directed verdict 
on the ground that the statement did not contain sufficient facts to 
establish, if proved, plaintiff's right to recovery? In Jones v. Hicks103 
the court held that, where defendant's motion for directed verdict 
apprised the plaintiff of the insufficiencies of his statement and where 
plaintiff did not move to amplify it or correct it, no such duty arises.104 
The proposed court rules restate Rule 37, section 2, in milder 
language, eliminating the word "duty" and providing for waiver of 
opening statements with the consent of the court and opposing coun-
se1.105 They would not seem to change the result of the instant case. 
Trial: Comment by Judge During Trial: In recognition of the 
fact, sometimes disputed, that judges are human, the Supreme Court 
has continued its rule of reprimanding, but not reversing, for unjudi-
cial remarks made by the judge during the course of trial unless there 
is a fairly clear showing of bias and prejudice. Thus, the occasional 
use of sharp language in overruling defense objections~ while of du-
100. See P.A. 1955, 269 § 711 et seq.; C.L. § 602.139, M.S.A. § 27.264 (Cum. Supp. 
1959). 
101. 357 Mich. 620, 99 N.W.2d 545 (1959), also discussed supra under the topic 
"Res Judicata: Merger." 
102. Id. at 624, 99 N.W.2d at 546. 
103. 35& Mich. 474, 100 N.W.2d 243 (1960). 
104. This holding is not inconsistent with earlier cases which have held that a 
verdict should not be directed on the opening statement unless counsel has had an 
opportunity to correct the insufficiency. See discussion in Vida v. Miller Allied In-
dus., 347 Mich. 257, 79 N.W.2d 493 (1956). 
105. Proposed rule 50.7.1. 
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bious taste, does not constitute reversible error.IOS Even a remark 
which could have led the jury to believe that the judge thought plain-
tiff guilty of contributory negligence will not be deemed prejudicial 
in the absence of any indication of how it was said, i.e., the judge's 
attitude and tone of voice.101 Furthermore, it is within the judge's 
prerogative to interrupt cross-examination to make comments de-
signed to protect the witness from improper or misleading questions 
and statements. lOS 
Trial: Closing Arguments: Attorneys are entitled to wide latitude 
in their closing arguments. Thus, the Supreme Court labels much 
that is said reprehensible, but not reversible. In Elliott v. A. J. Smith 
Contracting CO.,I°9 for example, a suit to recover for the negligently 
caused death of a young child, plaintiff's counsel, on the first day of 
Holy Week, made extensive references to the Bible in his argument 
with respect to the value of the decedent's life. In ruling that counsel's 
argument was not prejudicial, the court considered whether it was an 
improper appeal to passion. Admitting that the line between an argu-
ment which is skillful but fair and one that is inflammatory and im-
proper is a hard line to draw, the court upheld the argument on the 
ground that it was relevant to the key issue, i.e., damages, and was 
not designed to arouse the jury's ire against any religious group. The 
case is especially important because the court refused to overturn a 
finding for plaintiff in the face of this argument plus four other 
questionable practices. This reflects an important consideration which 
seems to influence the court's reaction to appeals from jury trials in 
negligence cases: The court noted that unless it ceases to tamper with 
the trial and decision of these cases, but instead throws law books full 
of technical impediments in front of parties seeking "simple justice" 
for "pressing social problems," the transfer of these cases to an ad-
ministrative agency is inevitableYo 
In other cases dealing with closing argument, the court held 
that the incorrect statement of law of only indirect importance to 
the case is not reversible error where, after timely objection, no further 
reference to the point was made and where no request to charge on 
the point was made; 111 that it was error for the court to refuse 
to permit plaintiff's counsel, in his summation, to comment on a 
variance between pleading and proof where the allegation in the 
106. Patrick v. Carrier-Stevens Co., 358 Mich. 94, 99 N.W.2d 518 (1959). 
107. Britten v. Updyke, 357 Mich. 466, 98 N.W.2d 660 (1959). 
lOS. Nowicki v. Podgorski, 359 Mich. 18, 101 N.W.2d 371 (1960). 
109. 358 Mich. 398, 100 N.W.2d 257 (1960). 
110. Id. at 422, 100 N.W. 2d at 265. See also Smith v. Hensch, 358 Mich. 334, 
337-8, 100 N.W.2d 287, 288 (1960). 
111. Linaberry v. LaVasseur, 359 Mich. 122, 101 N.W.2d 388 (1960). 
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answer which was contradicted on the stand by the defendant him-
self, was an admission under Court Rule 17, section 10; 11:: that the use 
of the word "steal" in plaintiff's summation of a case charging defend-
ants with fraud, while improper, was not grounds for reversal where 
no objection was made by defendant's counsel; 113 and, lastly, the 
court suggested that the failure of plaintiff to call an available wit-
ness, not proved to be within his control, may be the subject of com-
ment in defendant's summation, even though defendant is not entitled 
to have the jury charged that they are entitled to presume that, had 
the witness testified, her testimony would have been unfavorable to 
plaintiff.l14 
Trial: Instructions to the Jury: Cases decided during the Survey 
period reflect the court's reluctance to overturn jury verdicts on the 
ground of error in the instruction to the jury unless, on viewing the 
entire charge, it is fairly obvious (1) that the error was not cleared 
Up,115 and (2) that it resulted in prejudice tantamount to a miscarriage 
of justice.u~ Thus, the trial court's charge or refusal t·:) charge was 
sustained, though sometimes criticized, in the following situations: 
Where the jury was instructed that plaintiff could recover under the 
death act or for negligence, although the correct charge should have 
indicated that recovery could be had for negligence by virtue of the 
Death Act;117 where the jury was instructed on the "assured clear 
distance" rule although the evidence did not support its. applicability 
to the case; 118 where the trial judge instructed that plaintiff could not 
recover unless defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the 
deceased's death, when he should have said a proximate clause and 
where plaintiff was not dead;119 where the instructions did not refer 
112. Vachon v. Todorovich, 356 Mich. 182, 97 N.W.2d 122 (1959), also discussed 
infra in connection with the topic "Instructions to the Jury." 
113. Nowicki v. Podgorski, 359 Mich. 18, 101 N.W.2d 371 (1960), also discussed 
supra in connection with the topic "Comment by the Judge During Trial." 
114. Barringer v. Arnold, 358 Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365 (1960), also discussed 
infra under the topic "Instructions to the Jury." 
115. See generally 6 Callaghan's Mich. Pleading & Practice 166-189 (1947), and see 
cases cited id. at 168, n.12. 
116. C.L. § 650.28, M.S.A. § 27.2618. 
117. Elliott v. A. J. Smith Contracting Co., 358 Mich. 398, 100 N.W.2d 257 (1960) 
(subsequent paragraphs cleared up the ambiguity). 
118. Ibid. Cf. Duncan v. Strating, 357 Mich. 654, 99 N.W.2d 559 (1959) (where 
trial judge correctly refused to charge as to the "assured clear distance" rule); Lina-
berry v. LaVasseur, 359 Mich. 122, 101 N.W.2d 388 (1960) (where trial judge correctly 
refused to charge that defendant-driver's striking of rear end of plair,tUf's vehicle con-
stituted a prima facie case of negligence. Justice Black dissented on the ground that 
the question whether or not the presumption had been rebutted should have been 
sent to the jury). 
119. Rouse v. Gross, 357 Mich. 475, 98 N.W.2d 562 (1959). Cf. Barringer v. 
Arnold, 358 Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365 (1960). In the Rouse case the court's claim 
that the erroneous use of "the proximate cause" instead of "a proximate cause" was 
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to applicable statutes included in plaintiff's requests, which, if vio-
lated, would have made defendant guilty of negligence per se; 120 where 
the court refused to charge on the presumption of due care on the part 
of decedent, a proper instruction under the circumstances; 121 and 
where the court refused to give a proper request that a rear end coIli-
sion gives rise to a prima facie case of negligence.122 
Other decisions reaffirmed the rule that the judge is not required 
to instruct the jury as to the presumption arising from a party's 
failure to call an available witness if the witness was not under the 
control of that party and if he was also available to subpoena by the 
other party.123 In fact, giving such an instruction under these circum-
stances constitutes reversible error.124 
In addition to the last cited case, improper instructions con-
tributed to reversal in Vachon v. Todorovich126 and Holbert v. Stan-
iakP·fJ Both were negligence cases. In Vachon defendant offered no 
proof of plaintiff's contributory negligence. Plaintiff requested the 
court to charge the jury that defendant had failed to prove contribu-
tory negligence. The court erroneously refused this proper instruc-
tion. In Holbert the Supreme Court held that where evidence of de-
fendant's exceeding the speed limit was undisputed, requiring a find-
ing of negligence per se, a proper charge to this effect, when requested 
by plaintiff, must be given. The court said: "Where all of the evi-
dence on both sides tends clearly to prove a fact, such fact may, and 
generally should be assumed as proved; and in such case a charge 
to the jury indicating that it is competent for them to find either way 
is error.nl27 
The proposed court rule dealing with instructions to the jury 
later cleared up by an instruction that the negligence of the plaintiff's driver could not 
be imputed to the plaintiff, is open to serious question, since the jury's capacity to 
relate the one statement in the charge to the other is over-optimistically estimated. 
120. Britten v. Updyke, 357 Miell. 466, 98 N.W.2d 660 (1959) (the court here 
felt that the charge, in its entirety, was satisfactory "although it would have been 
improved by reference to the statutes cited by appellants and to the fact that violation 
of them was negligence per se"). 
121. Ibid. (Reversal refused because the jury found that defendant was not 
negligent) . 
122. Linaberry v. LaVasseur, 359 Miell. 122, 101 N.W.2d 388 (1960) (the statute 
calling for this instruction was C.L.S. 1956 § 257.402, M.S.A. § 9.2102. The court refused 
the instruction on the grounds that enough evidence of plaintiff's own negligence had 
been introduced to cause the presumption to disappear. See prior discussion in note 
118, supra). 
123. DeGroff v. Clark, 358 Mich. 274, 100 N.W.2d 214 (1960); Barringer v. 
Arnold, 358 Mich. 594, 101 N.W.2d 365 (1960). 
124. Barringer v. Arnold, supra note 123. 
125. 356 Miell. 182, 97 N.W.2d 122 (1959). 
126. 359 Miell. 283, 102 N.W.2d 186 (1960). 
127. Id. at 295, 102 N.W.2d at 189. 
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consolidates most of the current practice into one four-part rule.128 
It adds a requirement that objections to the charge must be made 
before the jury retires to consider the verdict,129 and provides for 
preliminary instructions during the course of trial to enhance the 
jury's understanding of the case,130 and for further instructions while 
the jury is deliberating.l31 
Trial: Fact and Law. Motions for Directed Verdict and New 
Trial: In a series of cases decided during the Survey period the court 
could not reach complete agreement on the boundaries of the domain 
of the trier of fact as compared with the judge of law. In general, it 
may be said that the majority of the court is not averse to clouding 
the distinction between the two domains in cases tried without jury, 
but the distinction is entitled to more careful preservation in jury 
cases. The first such case, Galea v. Detroit Wabeek Bank & Trust 
Co.,l32 was a negligence case tried before a judge sitting alone. Two 
defendants, an owner and a lessee of a building from which an awn-
ing fell on the plaintiff, were connected to the accident with little 
or no evidence. Defendant-owner was found to be free of liability 
after trial on the merits. Defendant-lessee, who might have been liable 
under the "Michigan doctrine of res ipsa loquiturlll33 moved to dis-
miss after the plaintiff concluded his proofs. The judge, examining the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, granted his mo-
tion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Voelker, how-
ever, vigorously dissented on the ground that plaintiff had made out a 
prima facie case sufficient to send the case to the trier of fact,134 and 
that, since "non-jury cases are to be tried 'as near as may be' as 
cases tried with a jurym35 it was improper to decide the case on a 
defense motion for judgment. The majority opinion noted that the 
judge, by using the "most favorable" test, applied a stricter standard 
than the "clear preponderance" test which would have been applicable 
if tried on the facts, and that this stricter standard worked in plain-
tiff's favor, not against him. In essence, the court said, the lower 
court by ruling on the motion made "a finding of fact which was in 
accord with the clear preponderance of the evidence.lll3G The upshot 
of this decision is that, in a case tried without jury, the motion for 
128. Current practice is contained in M.C.R. 37, § 9 and C.L. §§ 691.431-.434, 
M.S.A. §§ 27.1091-.1093. The proposed rule is 50.16. 
129. Proposed rule 50.16.2. 
130. Id. 50.16.3. 
131. Id. 50.16.4. 
132. 357 Mich. 333, 98 N.W.2d 503 (1959). 
133. Id. at 337, 98 N.W.2d at 507 (Dissent). 
134. See Mitcham v. City of Detroit, 355 Mich. 182, 94 N.W.2d 388 (1959). 
135. C.L. § 618.14, M.S.A § 27.994. 
136. Supra note 132, at 343, 98 N.W.2d at 505. 
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directed verdict may become a vehicle for trying the facts.131 Con-
trast, however, DeLuca v. Wonnacott/3S a jury case, where the Su-
preme Court reversed a judgment entered on a verdict directed for 
defendant. This time Justice Voelker spoke for the majority. Looking 
at the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, he found that 
there were questions of fact raised upon which reasonable people 
could disagree. Therefore, it was improper for the trial judge to de-
cide the case on motion for directed verdict. In his opinion, Justice 
Voelker quoted from his dissent in Galea: "We do not seek to destroy 
the motion [for directed verdict], but simply to restore it to the 
proper and relatively modest place it once enjoyed in our law.1l139 
By these two cases, a double standard has been established for jury 
and non-jury cases. 
This double standard for jury and non-jury cases, whereby a 
mid-trial motion for verdict can be based upon both the law and facts 
in the latter case, but only on the law in the former, would be codified 
under the proposed rulesYo However, the danger which presents it-
self in Galea, that a judge in a non-jury case would confuse the stand-
ards for quantum and quality of proof required for findings of fact, 
as compared with rulings of law, is eliminated by requiring the judge, 
when he makes both types of rulings in deciding a single motion, to 
separately report his findings of fact and conclusions of law.l41 Only 
in this way can the Supreme Court determine, on appeal, whether the 
trial judge correctly performed his dual function. 
Two other decisions reported during the period point up an-
other area where the courts ignore the distinction between law and 
fact: Where, on a view most favorable to the plaintiff, he is entitled 
at best to nominal damages, it is not reversible error to direct a verdict 
for defendant, even in a jury case.142 
One other case in this area merits passing comment. In Bonner 
v. Ames143 the trial court entered a directed verdict at the close of 
plaintiff's proofs without first allowing the plaintiff to reopen his 
proofs to clear up a relevant point, the establishment of certain dis-
137. Accord, Emons v. Shiraef, 359 Mich. 526, 102 N.W.2d 490 (1960) (See 
dissent of Justice Black at 538, 102 N.W.2d at 496). 
138. 358 Mich. 319, 100 N.W.2d 288 (1960). 
139. Id. at 325, 100 N.W.2d at 291. 
140. Proposed rules 50.4.2 and 50.15. 
141. Id. 50.17, 50.4.2. 
142. Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99 N.W.2d 362 (1959); Vachon v. Todoro-
vich, 356 Mich. 182, 97 N.W.2d 122 (1959). Cf. 6 Callaghan's Mich. Pleading & Prac-
tice 132 (1947). 
Another area in which the court has caused confusion is illustrated in Linaberry v. 
LaVasseur, 359 Mich. 122, 101 N.W.2d 388 (1960) (Dissent). See note 118, supra. 
143. 356 Mich. 537, 97 N.W.2d 87 (1959). 
28 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7 
tances in feet instead of "blocks." Defendant did not show that sur-
prise, inconvenience, deception or prejudice would have resulted from 
a reopening of proofs. Therefore, the court held that the trial court, 
in refusing to allow plaintiff leave to reopen, abused its discretion. 
Relief from Judgment or Decree: The question whether a judg-
ment entered against a garnishee defendant who had filed a disclosure 
but no answer denying liability, was a default judgment, was raised in 
Crew v. Zabowsky.144 Defendant moved to vacate the judgment more 
than five months after it was entered. If it were a default judgment 
Court Rule 28 would control and defendant's motion would have been 
filed too late. The court held that the judgment entered on defend-
ant's disclosure was not entered by default, and upheld the court's 
order vacating the judgment. The court in this case carefully limited 
the definition of a judgment by default. 
Some doubt was cast on the important recent case of White v. 
Sadler145 in Moody v. Carnegie.l46 There, the Supreme Court, in a 
four to four decision, affirmed the granting of a motion for a rehear-
ing in an equity action. The motion was filed more than four months 
after entry of the decree147 and was based mainly on the failure of 
plaintiff's attorney to apprise her of the imminence of trial, so that 
she was not present when the trial took place. The decision calling 
for affirmance ruled that the neglect of plaintiff's attorney worked a 
fraud upon plaintiff and upon the court by depriving plaintiff "of her 
rights to have her cause of action properly presented to the court 
through her own testimony." In the dissent, Justice Black vigorously 
argued that this motion should not have been granted on this ground, 
for two reasons: (1) Absent fraud on the part of the opposite party, 
the misdeeds of plaintiff's own attorney should not be grounds for 
upsetting a decree in defendant's favor, and (2) nothing that 
amounted to fraud was shown. Plaintiff's remedy, if any, he asserted, 
was against her attorney; the decree itself should not have been 
disturbed. 
This decision, insofar as it rests on the alleged fraud of plain-
tiff's own attorney (and not on an additional ground, the failure of 
defendants to observe certain notice requirements), is open to ques-
tion. In addition to the unfairness of finding an attorney guilty of 
144. 357 Mich. 606, 99 N.W.2d 542 (1959). 
145. 350 Mich. 511, 87 N.W.2d 192 (1957), discussed in King & Wunsch, Civil 
Procedure, 1958 Survey of Mich. Law, 5 Wayne L. Rev. 184 (1958). Accord Melvin 
v. Reading, 351 Mich. 332, 88 N.W.2d 620 (1958). 
146. 356 Mich. 434, 97 N.W.2d 46 (1959). 
147. See M.C.R. 48, which limits the time within which a rehearing may be applied 
for to a maximum of four months. Fraud is one of the five exceptions to this rule. 
See Honigman, Mich. Court Rules Annot. 503 (1949). 
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negligence or fraud when he is not present to defend himself,148 it 
opens Michigan decrees and jUdgments to attack on questionable 
grounds long after the established time for direct attack has expired. 
Thus, in a suit on a judgment the defendant is encouraged to hunt into 
every corner to find (if not to fabricate) something tantamount to the 
affirming judges' loose definition of "fraud" on the part of his own 
attorney as a means of resisting the judgment. The holder of the 
judgment is then required to defend his rights by refuting matters 
which are not within his competence to know.149 
Appellate Review: In Kennedy v. Kennedy/50 a four to three 
decision, the Supreme Court excavated a potential pitfall for attor-
neys. Defendant entered a special appearance in a divorce action and 
filed a motion to quash service. When the chancellor denied his mo-
tion he did not enter a general appearance, but instead sought leave to 
appeal from the order denying his motion. Before the Supreme Court 
ruled on his petition for leave to appeal he was defaulted by the plain-
tiff. The Supreme Court then denied the appeal, and defendant filed 
a general appearance in the lower court and a motion to set aside the 
default. This motion was denied and an absolute divorce, pro con-
fesso, was entered for the plaintiff. On appeal from the decree the 
defendant argued, and a majority of the justices agreed, that the 
chancellor had abused his discretion by refusing to set aside the de-
fault. They reasoned that defendant was only exercising his right to 
contest the court's jurisdiction before going to a trial on the merits 
in order to save time and money; he was not trying improperly to 
evade the court's jurisdiction. The minority, relying on Court Rule 
62, sections 5 and 6, pointed out that only the granting of leave to 
appeal from an interlocutory order stays proceedings in the court 
below; here, the defendant had been defaulted before the Supreme 
Court had acted on his petition to appeal. Furthermore, it was open 
to the defendant to have requested, under Court Rule 18, section 4, 
an extension of the time within which to file a general appearance. 
This he did not do. Because three of the justices (Black, Edwards 
and Voelker) joined in the minority, and because Justice Smith was 
not sitting, the minority opinion may control in some future case. 
Thus, a wise course of action will be to secure an extension of the 
148. See King & Wunsch, supra note 145. 
149. One section of the proposed rules would seem to allow relief from a judg-
ment for fraud only when it is the fraud of an "adverse party." Proposed rule 50.28.3(3). 
Another section, however, would permit relief from a decree for "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Proposed rule 50.28.3(6). This 
last section would seem to permit the courts to apply the broad rule of Moody v. 
Carnegie. 
150. 358 Mich. 542, 100 N.W.2d 481 (1960). 
30 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7 
time within which to enter a general appearance before seeking 
leave to appeal from an appealable in~erlocutory order.l5l 
Klopfenstein v. RohlfingI52 resolved a conflict between two in-
consistent statutes. The first provides that ". . . all causes in which 
no action has been taken or progress made for more than 1 year . . . 
shall be dismissed by the court for want of prosecution.ll1u3 The 
second allows a longer period prior to dismissal: "If an appeal shall 
have been or shall be on the no progress docket of the circuit court 
for a period of two years, on motion the appeal shall be dis-
missed .... "154 The question was, which of these two statutes gov-
erned an appeal from the Municipal Court of Grand Rapids to the 
circuit court which had been on the docket for more than one year 
but less than two. The court noted that if the first statute governed, 
no appeal could remain on the no progress docket for two years. 
Therefore, it held that the longer statute is to apply to appeals from 
the lower court to the circuit court; the shorter statute, to cases ori-
ginally commenced in the circuit court. 
In a few decisions during the Survey period the court laid down 
some preferences as to the contents of the appendix filed on appeal: I {ju 
In light of the specific requirement of the court rules that appellant 
include an unbiased statement of facts in his appendix, the court, in 
City of Madison Heights v. Manto/56 served notice that it looks with 
jaundiced eye on parties who file competing statements which require 
the court laboriously to pick out the inaccuracies and supply the in-
sufficiencies by comparing the appendices of both parties and the rec-
ord. Perhaps the adversary system is too far ingrained ever to permit 
such desired objectivity on the part of counsel, but wise lawyers will 
not ignore the court's admonition. In Karvonen v. Stankovich107 
testimony which was taken before appellant became a party to the 
workmen's compensation proceeding was included in the appendix to 
appellee's brief. While not grounds for reversal, the Supreme Court 
expressly disapproved "the practice of including in an appendix ... " 
such testimony.15s 
151. Under the proposed rules, whether or not proceedings are stayed hinges on 
the filing of an appeal bond, not on the granting of leave to appeal. See proposed 
rule 80.8. 
152. 356 Mich. 197, 96 N.W.2d 782 (1959). 
153. C.L. § 618.2, M.S.A. § 27.982. 
154. C.L. § 678.21a, M.S.A. § 27.3501(1). 
155. See generally M.C.R. 67, 68. 
156. 359 Mich. 244, lO2 N.W.2d 182 (1960). Cf. Masella v. Bisson, 359 Mich. 
512, lO2 N.W.2d 468 (1960) (The court refused to strike irrelevancies and other im-
proper matter from the statement of facts, but merely disregarded them). 
157. 357 Mich. 96, 97 N.W.2d 715 (1959). 
158. Id. at 102, 97 N.W.2d at 719. 
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Miscellany: In In re Ziegler's Petition159 the court warned "that 
a pre-trial brief should never be presented to the tribunal who makes 
the final decision unless under supervision and with the consent of the 
presiding judicial officer.nl60 Nonetheless, it was not grounds for re-
versal for claimant, in an eminent domain proceeding, to mail a brief 
to the commissioners before the hearing without presenting a copy to 
the petitioner on the same day (a few days before the hearing), where 
the brief did not misstate the law, where its "tone" was not pre-
judicial, and where the opposite party had a full opportunity to state 
its position. 
An amendment to the garnishment statute which permits the 
court to discontinue proceedings against the garnishee at any time 
prior to judgment for good cause shown,16l was upheld as constitu-
tional against plaintiff's claim that the amendment constituted an 
improper delegation of legislative power to the judiciary, in Johnson 
v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc.162 In this case the court had 
dismissed the garnishment action when the original defendant estab-
lished, by affidavits and financial statements, that its assets were suffi-
cient to satisfy any judgment. The decision is a sound one, since it 
effectively permits the court to restrict the use of garnishment to 
cases where it will protect the plaintiff against a defendant tottering 
on the brink of financial disaster, or whose liquidity is subject to 
question, but prevents it from being used as a method of harassing 
or embarrassing an otherwise solvent defendant.163 
A judgment in a replevin suit may not be overturned simply be-
cause the plaintiff, who secured a bond, gave it to the deputy sheriff, 
and sent notice of the amount of the bond and the names of the sure-
ties to the clerk of court and defendant's attorney, did not also file 
the bond with the court. In the same case, Van Dyk v. Utter/64 the 
court also held that replevin will lie even though the defendant has 
turned over a portion of the plaintiff's property to another. Plaintiff 
is not required to bring a separate assumpsit action at law in order to 
secure his money judgment for the transferred property.16G 
159. 357 Mich. ZO, 97 N.W.Zd 748 (1959). 
160. Id. at Z5, Z6, 97 N.W.2d at 750, 751. 
161. C.L. § 628.41, M.S.A. § 27.1895. 
162. 357 Mich. Z54, 98 N.W.2d 586 (1959). 
163. The proposed rules with respect to garnishment "are derived from existing 
law" but contain "[s]ubstantial changes in form and organization .•• and a logical 
rearrangement of location in rules and statutes." See proposed rules, p. 223 ff. 
164. 357 Mich. 329, 98 N.W.2d 540 (1959). 
165. Cf. Multiplex Concrete Mach. Co. v. Saxer, 310 Mich. 243, 17 N.W.2d 
169 (1945); Brewster Loud Lumber Co. v. General Builders' Supply Co., 233 Mich. 
633,208 N.W. 28 (1926). 
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CONCLUSION 
Even the foregoing brief discussion of cases decided just within 
the period of one year reveals several areas where the proposed court 
rules would have a profound effect on Michigan practice and proce-
dure. Without repeating in detail each such area, it may be concluded 
that these rules might achieve the following general objectives: First, 
they would tend to make it more difficult for a lawyer to waive his 
client's rights by inadvertence, or even outright stupidity. Secondly, 
related rules and statutes now spread throughout the rule and statute 
books would in many areas be consolidated into concise, almost com-
prehensible, statements located in easy-to-find sections. Thirdly, they 
would eliminate from the statutes matters which are inherently and 
by constitutional mandate the prerogative of the judiciary, and re-
locate them in the rules. Fourthly, they would provide satisfactory 
and simple solutions to problems which have been troubling our 
courts and the bar for years. And lastly, they would eliminate many 
procedural niceties which serve no useful purpose in the orderly ad-
ministration of justice. A responsible bar cannot afford to ignore 
these reforms. 
